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Recent  farm export gains have  been  almost  as spectacular  as  the
export drop  of 39 percent from the $43.8 billion high of fiscal year
1981  to  $26.3  billion in  1986.  U.S.  farm export volume  and value  in-
creased nearly one-third the last two years (Table  1).
Table  1. U.S.  Farm Export Volume  and Value
Fiscal  Year  Percentage Change
1986  1987  1988  1986-87  1987-88  1986-88
Value ($  bil.)  26.3  27.9  33.5  6  20  27
Volume  (mmt)  109.9  129.2  145.5  18  13  32
From  1986  to  1987  the value  gain was from  volume.  From  1987  to
1988 the value  gain was from price and volume.  It is notable that the
32 percentage  loss  in export volume from  1981  to  1986  was precisely
equal to the percentage  gain in volume from  1986 to 1988. Past ex-
port volatility raises questions  regarding long-term farm  export pros-
pects but  compounds  difficulties  of projecting.  The  purpose  of this
paper is to examine export prospects in the intermediate  to long run.
The economic  future  of agriculture  is tied  to export prospects.
Farm commodity prices have closely tracked export volume:  High
exports  and high  farm prices  have gone  together.  The  farm prices-
export fit would be even closer in the absence of government pro-
grams cushioning economic impacts of export decline.
Background
Sources  of Change in Exports
Geographic  sources  of the downturn  in U.S.  exports  from  1981  to
1986 are  shown in Table  2.  Export value losses were broad-based
among  countries  and regions in part because  price  changes were
general.  Prices fell an average 8 percent,  hence representative
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145Table 2.  U.S.  Agricultural Exports by Region,  Fiscal  1981 and 1986
Change  1981 to  1986
Region  1981  1986  Absolute  Percent
($  Million)
EC-12  10,576  6,432  -4,144  -39.2
Other West Europe  710  415  -295  -41.6
Eastern  Europe  1,940  447  -1,493  -77.0
USSR  1,573  1,105  -486  -30.9
China  2,118  83  - 2,035  -96.1
India  324  90  - 234  - 72.2
Taiwan  1,105  1,109  4  0.4
Japan  6,706  5,139  - 1,567  - 23.4
Other Asia  5,712  4,073  - 1,639  - 28.7
Egypt  950  875  - 75  -7.9
Nigeria  491  158  - 333  - 67.8
Other Africa  1,351  1,101  -250  -18.5
Latin America
&  Caribbean  6,861  3,598  - 3,263  -47.6
Canada
a
3,154  1,466  - 556  - 27.5
Oceania  208  216  8  3.7
Total  43,779  26,307  - 17,472  - 39.9
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (August 1988,  p. 58,  and earlier issues).
a Includes transshipments in  1981; these were not included in the change in exports.
Table  3.  U.S.  Agricultural Exports by Region,  Fiscal  1986 and 1988
Change  1986 to  1988







































































































Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture (August  1988,  p. 58, and earlier issues).
Icountries with a loss in export value  of less than 8 percent expanded
import  quantity  from the  United  States.  Proportionately  and  abso-
lutely,  the  European  Community  (EC-12),  China  and Latin America
were major sources  of the decline in U.S.  exports.  Major absolute
losses also came from Eastern Europe, Japan and "Other Asia."
The  centrally  planned  economies  contributed  significantly  to the
U.S.  export  rebound  from  1986  to  1988  shown in Table  3.  These
economies  obviously  are  a  continuing  source  of trade  instability.
(Data precluded comparison  of exactly the same  countries in Table 3
as  in Table  2).  Asian  countries  made  major  contributions to the  ex-
port recovery.  Export prices increased  on average by  7  percent,
hence gains in value  in excess of that amount were gains in quantity.
Now  turning to U.S.  exports by  commodity,  grains  and soybeans
(and  products  therefrom)  constituted  nearly  half of the  value  of all
U.S. exports  in FY  1988  (Table 4).  Soybeans  ranked first in value
even though soybean  oil and  meal exports are included  in "Other."
Because  of their importance,  emphasis is  on soybeans,  coarse  grains
and wheat in subsequent analysis.
Export Trends
Demand for U.S. farm exports will depend  on future trends in for-
eign  supply  and  demand  for food,  expecially  in Third World  coun-
Table 4.  U.S.  Agricultural Exports by  Commodity, Fiscal 1986 and 1988
Change  1986 to  1988
Commodity  1986  1988  Absolute  Percent
Soybeans
Value ($  bil.)  4.2  4.9  0.7  16.7
Volume  (mmt)  20.1  21.2  1.1  5.5
Coarse  Grains
& Products
Value ($  bil.)  3.8  4.6  0.8  21.1
Volume  (mmt)  36.2  52.3  16.1  44.5
Wheat &  Flour
Value ($bil.)  3.5  4.6  1.1  31.4
Volume  (mmt)  26.6  40.2  13.6  51.1
Cotton
Value ($  bil.)  0.7  2.2  1.5  214.3
Volume  (mmt)  0.5  1.4  0.9  180.0
Tobacco
Value ($  bil.)  1.3  1.2  -0.1  -7.7
Volume  (mmt)  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0
Meat (excluding
poultry)
Value ($  bil.)  1.0  1.2  0.2  20.0
Volume (mmt)  0.5  0.5  0.0  0.0
Other
Value ($  bil.)  11.8  14.8  3.0  25.4
Volume  (mmt)  25.8  29.7  3.9  15.1
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture  (August  1988,  p. 57).
147tries.  Less developed  countries  accounted  for  42  percent  of U.S.
farm export  markets  in fiscal  1988 and their share is  growing (Table
3).  The principal  methods  of increasing  production  in the past in
these countries  offer  less opportunity  for the future.  Major  Third
World  wheat  producers-Mexico,  India,  Pakistan,  Turkey  and  Ar-
gentina-now have  84 percent of their total wheat area in high-yield-
ing,  semi-dwarf varieties according to  CIMMYT.  Many of the choice
opportunities  for expanding  both dryland  and irrigated  cropland
have  been  exploited,  especially  in Asia where  most  Third World
people live.
It is also  well to note that as income  improves  from  subsistence
levels,  diets  shift from  sorghum,  millet  and rice  to wheat,  and then
from  wheat or rice  to more  poultry and red meat.  That  means  that
as  incomes  in Third  World  countries  improve,  demand by  them for
U.S.  products tends to shift from  wheat to coarse grains and  soy-
bean meal used to feed livestock.
The high income  elasticity  of demand for  U.S.  exports in Third
World countries  is apparent  in growth trends.  From  1961-63  to
1981-83,  for example,  developing  countries accounted  for 63  percent
of the gain in U.S.  food grain exports,  49 percent  of the gain  in
coarse grain exports and 39 percent of the gain in oilseed  exports. In
contrast, industrial  countries accounted for only  3 percent of the gain
in U.S.  food grain exports,  23 percent of the gain  in coarse  grain ex-
ports and 44 percent of the gain in oilseed exports.
Change in the volume of export demand  over the demographic-
economic  transition  is also notable.  Absolute  demand for U.S.  farm
exports  is very low  in the poorest of the poor countries with high
birth and  death rates.  Need  is great  but effective  demand  is  small.
Often  our exports  to  such  countries  are  concessional.  As countries
break out  of subsistence  to  rapid  income  growth,  a  combination  of
high population growth (high birth rate, declining death rate) and
high income elasticity  of demand create  strong growth in food  de-
mand.  Because  the  education-research  institutional  structure  is  in-
adequately developed  to induce high rates of productivity  growth
and  expansion  of supply  in agriculture,  the  result is  sizable  excess
food demand  that can be satisfied  with food imports.  The Newly  In-
dustrialized  Countries  (NIC)  of Asia  fall into  this  rapid  food import
growth  category.  China,  Thailand,  Malaysia  and the  Indian subcon-
tinent have potential to reach this category.
As  middle-income  countries  progress,  birth  rates  and population
growth slow while high income from nonfarm industry supports farm
producer  subsidies  and trade  protection.  Superior  education-re-
search  institutions,  along  with well-developed  industry, turn out im-
proved inputs that spur agricultural productivity.  These factors com-
bine  to reduce growth  in food imports from the United  States and
other countries.
148Figure 1 graphically illustrates these concepts and also points to
U.S.  export growth  prospects.  Direct calorie  consumption  reaches  a
plateau of just over 3,000 per day at relatively low annual income per
capita,  approximately  $5,000.  However,  as  the composition  of those
calories changes from direct  consumption  of grains,  fruits and vege-
tables to include  more meat and processed  foods, direct and indirect
total calorie  consumption  plateaus  at nearly  12,000  calories per cap-
ita.  That is because one pound of grain equivalent can feed a person
for a day if eaten directly but four to six pounds of feed are required
to produce  a pound  of pork and eight to ten needed  to produce a
pound of beef.  Thus,  countries  of the Third World,  especially  those
with rapid  income growth,  have much potential to expand  U.S.
coarse grain and soybean imports  as they upgrade  diets in the proc-
ess of economic  growth.  As noted in Figure 1, Japan has potential
for more calories because of high income per capita which affords
transition  to  more meat.  But  diets are constrained  by tastes  and
slowly-changing  preferences.
Figure 1.  Per Capita Consumption of Primary Food Energy (PFE),
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Source: Adapted from Sanderson  and Mehra  (p. 84).
Developing  Countries and Debt Stress
Subsaharan Africa  seems to be the  only major region of the world
losing the capacity to feed itself as apparent in declining  food output
per capita.  In other developing countries,  production on average has
been  increasing more  rapidly than population  but less rapidly  than
consumption.  This fact, combined with increased production relative
to consumption  in developed  countries,  is manifest in growing re-















0somewhat  comparable  in developed  and  less  developed  economies
(Paarlberg,  p.  102;  Vocke,  p. 22).
The most rapid gains in import demand  for farm products have
come  in higher  income  developing  countries.  The  debt crisis  has
slowed  import growth  in developing  countries.  The quantity  of U.S.
agricultural  exports  to developing countries  doubled from  1975 to
1981  for an average  gain of  12 percent annually.  Exports  fell  30 per-
cent from 1981 to 1986 to no small extent because  of debt problems.
In the short  and intermediate  run, international debt stress has
pressured countries  to expand  agricultural  and other exports and
reduce imports to service debt.  Devoting exports to servicing past
debt rather than importing  productive  capital  goods  to increase  in-
come  reduces  long-term  growth and demand  for  agricultural  im-
ports.
Table  5 reveals the stubbornness of the debt  problem as apparent
in failure of efforts thus far to restructure debt (mostly just extending
the payment  period),  forgive  or write-off debt  (still modest),  and re-
sell debt  (now worth  only  50  cents  on the  dollar).  The  problem not
only is most severe in the Western Hemisphere  (mostly Latin Amer-
ica)  and Africa,  but by some standards  has  worsened  since  onset of
the debt crisis in 1982.  Debt as a percent  of exports and Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) increased  steadily in Africa from  1982 to  1988.
The ratio of debt  to exports and  GDP was higher  in Latin  America
than in Africa in 1982 but the former has made progress recently.  Al-
though the  debt-export  ratio remains  higher in  Latin  America than
in Africa, the debt-GDP ratio  is higher in Africa and  is rising.  The
conclusion  is  that the debt crisis  remains  severe,  is  likely  to persist
for some  years  and  will require  major  concessions  from banks  and
governments of creditor countries to bring relief.
Table 5.  Relative External Debt of Developing  Countries by  Region
Region  1982  1984  1986  1988
(As percent of Exports)
Western Hemisphere  271  273  350  322
Africa  156  171  237  238
Asia  88  88  101  89
Middle  East  46  69  111  108
(As percent  of GDP)
Western  Hemisphere  44  46  45  45
Africa  37  39  50  54
Asia  22  24  29  26
Middle  East  22  27  32  28
Source:  International Monetary  Fund, pp. 180-181.
Since  1982 net debt service payments of developing countries have
exceeded  new borrowings,  hence  capital  has flowed  from  Less De-
veloped Countries  (LDCs) to Developed  Countries  (DCs) (Shane and
Stallings,  p.  13).  Substantial  latent demand  for  U.S.  farm exports
150will emerge  if the debt crisis can be addressed successfully.  A return
to the U.S.  export demand  growth rate of 12 percent experienced  in
the 1975-81  period by LDCs is unlikely,  but a growth rate of half the
level,  6  percent,  seems  feasible and  is consistent  with the  overall
trend in exports  from  1975  to  1986.  This will  not occur,  however,
without  additional  writeoff  of debt  and without  strong economic
growth  in industrial countries which thereby provide markets and
foreign exchange  for the Third World to service debt.
Although  the so-called  Newly Industrialized  Countries  (NIC) of
Asia entered the  1980s  with considerable  debt, these  countries have
been able to "grow"  out of the  problem through  a strong  economic
growth  performance.  The  most notable  case  is  South Korea  which
went from external debt  of $47 billion  as recently  as  1985  to $36  bil-
lion in 1987  while debt as a proportion of GNP fell from 56 percent to
only 30 percent (International Monetary Fund,  p. 86).
As  Third  World  countries  approach  developed  country  status,
they can afford to, and do, subsidize and protect agriculture.  Taiwan
and South Korea are likely to be the object of confrontation with the
United  States over protectionism,  with the  governments  caught  be-
tween militant  domestic  nationalists  and agriculturalists  pressing
hard for protection and the United States pressing for liberalization.
South Korea  recently  announced  it would reduce tariffs on 436 agri-
cultural imports.  Cuts will  drop the average  tax on imports from the
current  25 percent to  20 percent by  1993.  Thus current  tariffs not
only are high but will remain high by  1993 even if the modest cuts
are made.
Spurred  by deregulation  and other  incentives,  China and  India
have experienced  rapid economic  growth  in recent years.  India,  for
example,  increased  manufacturing  output an annual average  of 9
percent over the past three years. These two  countries combined
have nine times the population  of Japan,  South Korea  and Taiwan
combined.  The latter accounted  for  $11  billion or one-third  of all
U.S.  farm exports in  fiscal  1988.  No one  expects  India and China to
be scale  models  of South Korea  or Taiwan,  but the  above  numbers
emphasize the potential for agricultural trade with continuing institu-
tional reform and economic  growth in India and China.
Peoples  Republic of China
Economic  reforms  introduced  in 1978-and  subsequent  modifica-
tions increasing privatization,  incentives  and  decentralization  of de-
cisions-sharply  increased  production  of crops  to  1985.  Production
gains  have slowed  substantially since  1985  especially in grains be-
cause  easy  gains from economic  reform  have  been exploited,  farm-
ers have followed market  incentives to produce  cash crops rather
than grain and weather has been less favorable.
The Peoples  Republic of China (PRC) offers exciting trade poten-
151tial because it  has several  characteristics  of Taiwan  and South
Korea-a high man/land ratio along with a culture conducive to eco-
nomic growth.  The  major missing ingredient in China for rapid eco-
nomic and trade  growth is a stable institutional structure  allowing
markets to work. Based on studies by the Chinese Academy of Agri-
cultural Sciences  and the World Bank, the Organization  for Econom-
ic Cooperation  and Development (OECD)  (p.  157) concluded  for year
2000  "that there would remain a large gap (about 40-50 million metric
tons/mmt)  [of grain consumption  in excess  of production]  if the  high-
er population  variant (1.3  billion)  should turn out more realistic-
which  seems very likely."  This compares  with net grain imports of 7
million tons  in  1985  and  1986.  The scenarios  would require  political
stability,  continued  economic  reforms along lines originating in 1978,
a  more open  economy  and  successful  challenge  to the traditional
doctrine  of self-sufficiency.  In my judgment  there  is a 60  percent
chance that the PRC  will remain a weather  market (importing grain
in times of below average  yields)  and a 40  percent chance of becom-
ing a growth market  as noted above.  That equivocation regarding
long-term outlook will be apparent  in later projections by other ana-
lysts.
Soviet  Union
My first priority in a visit to the  Soviet  Union one year ago was  to
determine how glasnost and perestroika would  influence  their long-
term demand for agricultural imports.  Soviet agricultural  reforms in-
clude placing a greater proportion  (31 million  hectares in  1986,  for
example)  of  cropland  under  "intensive  cultivation"  with  improved
varieties  and more fertilizer  and pesticides,  decentralization  of deci-
sions (fewer  decisions from Moscow,  more from  contract "brigades"
which  can  be as small as  family  farm enterprises),  and incentives
tied to performance.  Recently,  a plan has been approved  to lease
land to individual farmers  for up to fifty years.
Grain output of 210 mmt in  1986,  211  mmt in 1987,  and 205  mmt in
1988 well exceeded  the 1981-85  average  of 180  mmt.  Output remains
far short of the  237  mmt produced  in  1978 or the 250  mmt target  set
by the USSR  for  1990.  The younger  Soviet economists  I talked  to
said they  believed  the  country  would  be  self-sufficient  in grains  by
1990,  importing  only some higher-quality blending wheat and soy-
beans.  An  older economist  who  had seen  numerous previous  plans
fall  short  of targets  was  pessimistic  about self-sufficiency  in  grains.
The best guess  is that  Soviet grain imports  will vary  widely from
year to year and will average closer  to the  30 mmt of recent years
than to zero.
The European Community
The  European  Community (EC)  went from  a  20 mmt  grain import
position  in the late  1970s  to a  15 mmt net export position  by the
152mid-1980s.  The EC  Commission expected the surplus for export
would reach 40 mmt by 1991/92 (Sanderson and Mehra,  p.  78).  How-
ever, the EC is changing  policies in ways that will not necessarily  ex-
pand U.S.  exports but will slow inroads  of the community  into tradi-
tional U.S.  export markets.
Including the 3 percent producer tax, supports for grains in the EC
were reduced  10  percent in 1987  following  a similar  reduction the
year before.  The EC  also has established  a land diversion  program
and a system of "stabilizers"  for grain and oilseeds that will cut sup-
port prices  automatically  if production  exceeds  specified  limits-160
mmt for grains.  The changes  in policies also will temper import sub-
stitution featuring subsidies for domestic oilseed production  to crowd
out U.S.  soybean  and corn  gluten protected  by the General  Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from direct EC interventions.
Export Assistance
Export assistance  programs include credit guarantees,  in-kind and
cash subsidies,  and Public Law 480 food aid.  GSM-102 and GSM-103,
the  former  a  short-run  and the  latter  an  intermediate-term  (6  to  36
months) export credit program,  protect U.S.  exporters against losses
from nonrepayment  of credit extended  by foreign  banks for such
sales. The Targeted Export Assistance Program (TEA) provides $110
million of in-cash or in-kind subsidies to export mostly high value-
added agricultural  products.  Partly because  of TEA, exports of high
value (mostly processed) agricultural products increased  substan-
tially even  as bulk exports  were falling  in the  1980s.  High value  ex-
ports in fiscal  1988 are expected  to reach $15.3  billion or nearly half
of all exports (U.S. Department of Agriculture,  August  1988, p.  24).
The Export  Enhancement Program (EEP) initially  was targeted at
Middle  East markets  contested with the  EC.  The program later was
broadened  to include  the  USSR,  China  and  selected  other  trading
partners.  EEP outlays totaled $643 million in FY 1987.
The EEP has  targeted  mainly  wheat.  Wheat  exports increased
from a near-term low of 915 mmt in  1985/86 to a forecast 1,500 mmt in
1988/89.  An Economic Research Service  model attributed 95 percent
of the expansion to four factors:  (1)  EEP,  (2)  the lower wheat loan
rate,  (3)  reduced wheat  yields  of competitors  and  (4)  increased  im-
ports  of centrally  planned  countries  (U.S. Department  of Agri-
culture,  July  1988,  p.  22).  One-third  of the three-year  increase  was
attributed  to EEP and nearly one-sixth to lower loan rates,  provi-
sions introduced  by the Food Security Act  of 1985.  Thus,  half of the
increase  was  attributed  to  implementation  of that act.  The  re-
mainder was  due mainly  to internal administrative  decisions  and
lower wheat production in the USSR. EEP targets mainly wheat and
wheat products accounting  for only 14 percent of U.S. exports.
The budget for PL 480 was $1.5  billion in FY  1988 to export 6 to  7
153mmt  to poor  countries.  This and  other food  assistance  programs
have been critical  to increase  export  buyer power of heavily-indebt-
ed  developing  countries.  Fully  30  percent  of exports  to  developing
countries have received export assistance  in recent years.
The  combined spending  for PL 480,  GSM  (subsidy equivalent
only), and EEP and TEA was $2.6 billion in fiscal  1987.  If each dollar
of subsidy generated a dollar of exports,  the programs expanded  ex-
ports  8 percent.  And  if PL 480  is  excluded,  programs  expanded  ex-
ports  3  percent.  It  follows  that termination  of export  assistance,
where politically  feasible,  is unlikely to reduce U.S.  farm  exports
much  more  than  5  percent overall.  Wheat  exports  especially  would
fall  sharply  if export  assistance were  terminated  before  world  debt
and EC  export subsidy competition problems are alleviated.
At  issue is the future  of 1985  farm  bill type inducements.  EEP,
dumping of Consumer Credit Corporation  (CCC) stocks  and un-
usually  low loan  rates  were  intended  to confront  EC  subsidies  and
provide  bargaining  leverage  in  GATT  and other negotiations.  They
were  designed  to enable  the United  States to reduce burdensome
stocks  through highly competitive  pricing  in world  markets.  Con-
tinuation  of policies  subsidizing  price  below  normal  world  levels
after stocks have been reduced  to manageable levels angers  com-
petitors  and  utilizes  U.S.  farm resources  that  have  higher value  in
other uses.  U.S.  export subsidies are likely to  be reduced in the face
of low CCC stocks and tighter supply-demand  balance.
GATT and Other Trade Negotiations
In multilateral  trade  negotiations  under the  GATT,  the  United
States has  called for the elimination  of all  agricultural subsidies  and
import  barriers  by  the  year  2000.  The only  acceptable  income  sup-
ports to agriculture  would  be "decoupled"  payments.  The United
States and the  Cairns Group of fourteen  countries call  for major  re-
structuring  of commodity  programs  unlikely  to  be acceptable  to the
EC and Japan.  It  is doubtful that the U.S.  administration  could  win
support for decoupling  from Congress, let alone from the EC and Ja-
pan  where  farming  interests  wield  even  greater  political  influence.
Perhaps  the best that can be hoped  for from the  Uruguay Round  of
GATT  is enough liberalization  to offset the mounting worldwide food
market interventions of recent years.  TEA and EEP could be bar-
gained  away  but presumably  with offsetting  concessions  from  com-
petitors to help maintain U.S. exports.
Other  agreements  and  negotiations  potentially can  influence  U.S.
agricultural trade.  In early 1988 Japan agreed to eliminate  quotas on
eight product categories  after  a GATT panel ruled  that ten quota
categories violated  GATT rules.  Quotas  will be eliminated  on mostly
minor commodities  for the  United States,  including prepared  foods,
dry beans,  sugar and peanuts.
154Of greater interest  is an agreement  to liberalize citrus and beef
trade  with Japan.  The beef-citrus  agreement  with  Japan  would
eliminate  quotas on each  commodity  by 1991.  However,  tariffs,  now
25  percent  on beef,  would  be raised  to  70  percent  in  1991  before
dropping  to 50  percent  in  1994.  The pact  could  double beef exports
to Japan from 2.1 percent of U.S.  production in 1988 to 4.0 percent in
1991.  The  benefits  to the United  States  from that liberalization  will
be restrained  by competition  for the Japanese  beef market from
Australia and for the citrus market from Southeast  Asia.  Scaleback
of Japanese rice subsidies could have a major impact but such policy
change  is highly unlikely.
The  U.S.-Canada  Free  Trade  Agreement  signed  2  January  1988
called  for  an end  to (1)  subsidies  on agricultural  exports  to each
other,  (2) dumping,  (3)  tariffs on agricultural products by 1998 and (4)
some nontariff barriers.  As yet, the agreement has not been ratified.
Mexico  and the United  States signed  a bilateral framework to  dis-
cuss  tariff and nontariff barrier  reductions.  Any thoughts  that such
negotiations  could lead to a  U.S.-Mexico  or North American  free
trade  area are dampened  by intense  opposition by U.S.  interests
fearful of major disruptions from highly competitive  Mexican imports
produced  by cheap  labor.  A free trade area  also is opposed by non-
agricultural Mexican industries fearful of losing protection from com-
petitive  U.S.  industries.  Proposals  surface intermittently  for a U.S.-
Japan  free  trade  agreement-proposals  that  are  as  promising  eco-
nomically as they are unpromising politically.  Numerous  other nego-
tiations are underway  including a new U.S.-Soviet grain-soybean
agreement.
Exchange  Rates
Real exchange  rates and world commodity prices strongly influ-
ence exports.  After rising 50 percent from  1980 to 1985,  real ex-
change  rates fell approximately  40 percent before  rising again  in
1988.  As of June  1988,  real agricultural  exchange  rates were  77 per-
cent  of the March  1973  level (U.S.  Department  of Agriculture,  Au-
gust  1988,  p.  56).  According  to estimates  by  economist  Ronald
McKinnon the dollar was over 30 percent undervalued  relative to
the yen in August  1988;  other currencies  were more  closely in align-
ment based on purchasing power parity.
No  major  realignment  of currencies  is  anticipated  in  subsequent
projections  for the next  decade but the dollar  is expected to  remain
relatively  low  while U.S.  federal budget  and foreign trade  deficit
problems are  being addressed.  Macroeconomic  policies  of the past
decade,  bringing  high  real interest and exchange  rates and high
budget  and trade  deficits,  created  massive  U.S.  debt  to foreigners
that must be  serviced.  As a  U.S.  industry  with comparative  advan-
tage  (see  Tweeten,  et  al.,  pp.  11-14,  for review  of literature),  agri-
155culture will play a key  role  in servicing that debt.  This dimension of
trade institutions provides some basis for U.S.  farm export optimism.
U.S.  Agricultural Export Projections
The above  considerations are prelude to the projections  of U.S.
agricultural  exports.  Assumptions underlying  the analysis herein  in-
clude steady technological  and economic  growth and normal weath-
er.  A  recession  is  likely  to  intervene  at  least  once before  year 2000
but may not materially  influence long-term growth trends.
The quantity of food produced  and consumed  is demand driven by
factors  such  as income  and population  and supply  driven by factors
such  as  technology  and  natural  resource  availability-all  mediated
by prices,  market interventions  and random elements.  U.S.  exports
may be viewed  as a function  of the  rate of increase in world produc-
tion and utilization,  world trade in relation to  production and utiliza-
tion, and the share of the United States in that trade.
We  first turn to demand.  World  population  growth  rates are  slow-
ing (Table  6).  While the rate of growth fell from 2.2 percent  in 1960 to
1.8 percent in  1980,  the net addition to population  increased  from 67
million  in 1960  to  80  million  in  1980.  The rate  of world population
growth  is projected  to  continue  to fall but the  absolute  annual addi-
tion to population is  projected to be 92 million by year 2000.
Table 6.  World Population  Growth Rates
Year  Growth Rate  Absolute  Growth
(Percent)  (Million)
1960  2.2  67
1970  2.0  74
1980  1.8  80
1990*  1.7  89
2000*  1.5  92
* Projected
Turning  now  to supply,  productivity,  as  measured  by metric tons
of production per hectare,  continues  to increase  in nearly  a straight
line for coarse grains,  wheat and soybeans  as shown in Figure  2.
The rate of increase is slowing.  Annual rates  of increase in world
crop yield per hectare predicted  from best-fit regression equation
trends shown  in Figure  2 are as follows:
Table 7. Annual World  Crop Yield Increases
Year  Growth Rate (%)
Coarse  Grains  Wheat  Soybeans
1960  2.7  3.3  1.3
1970  2.3  2.8  1.2
1980  2.0  2.5  1.0
1990*  1.8  2.2  0.9
2000*  1.6  2.0  0.8
* Projected
156Figure 2.  Actual and Predicted Trend Yields of World Coarse Grain,
Wheat,  and Soybeans,  1961-1987.
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a^-^o~~~~~Chemicals,  improved  varieties  and  irrigation,  which  have sharply
increased yields  in the Green Revolution,  seem to be losing their mo-
mentum.  Grain  yield  gains predicted  from  past trends by  year 2000
will near population growth projected earlier.  This suggests competi-
tion for  food supplies  and favorable  export markets  for countries
with a strong agricultural  base such as the United  States.  Of course,
new technologies  from recombinant  DNA  and other sources  could
reverse the  slowing productivity  trends.  An  alternative to increasing
output is  to  expand  cropland  area.  But  world  grain area  has  re-
mained  nearly  stable  since  1970.  Soybean  acreage  has  expanded
substantially  but  that expansion  is  slowing.  Soybean  yields  vary
widely according  to Figure 2.
World  food  production  growth  has been essentially  linear  but in-
creased  on average  by  2.2 percent per year  from  1976  to  1986.  (Fig-
Figure 3.  World Food Production per Capita Trends from 1976-1986.
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158ure 3).  The rate was  higher  in developing  countries  (2.9 percent)
than in developed  countries  (1.6 percent).  However,  per capita pro-
duction grew  more  slowly  in developing  countries  because  of more
rapid population  growth.  Food production in  centrally planned
countries grew at the world average  rate.
Based  on the  1976-86 trend,  world food production is increasing
1.9 percent per year and is predicted to increase only 1.6 percent an-
nually by year  2000.  On average,  world agricultural trade  increased
1.3 percent  for  each  1 percent  increase  in  food production  and uti-
lization  over the past two decades.
Assuming  world food production  increases  1.6 percent annually
and  the elasticity  of trade with respect  to production  is  1.3,  agri-
cultural trade is projected  to only grow  1.6(1.3)  =  2.1 percent an-
nually.  If our share  of world trade  is constant  in the  long  run, U.S.
agricultural trade  could grow only  2 percent annually  on average  in
year 2000.  Of course,  cyclical  and annual variation around that trend
will be substantial.
Turning  now  to  alternative  estimates  for  individual  commodities,
the rate of commodity export expansion  is estimated  from the  prod-
uct of (1)  the rate  of increase  in world population,  times  (2)  the  elas-
ticity of world utilization  with respect to population growth,  times (3)
the  elasticity  of world  trade  with respect  to world  utilization,  times
(4) the  elasticity of U.S.  trade with respect to  world trade. Based  on
elasticities  estimated empirically  by commodity and based on pro-
jected world population  growth of 1.5  percent per year in year 2000,
the projected  rates of growth in U.S.  exports are as follows  for year
2000:
Table 8. Projected U.S.  Export Growth Rate (%  per year)
Soybeans  5.7
Coarse Grain  4.5
Wheat  2.7
Weighted  Average  4.5
These  are  probably  upper  limits  because  they  are  from elasticities
estimated with  historical  data from  1961  to  1987.  This period was
chosen to encompass stable,  falling and rising U.S. shares  but on the
whole was dominated by trade expansion.
World trade  in high-value products such as processed foods and
meats  increased  from  $60  billion  in  1973  to  $152  billion  in  1986
(Green,  p.  6).  In real (quantity) terms,  the increase  was rather
steady  (averaging  4.8 percent per year)  with  no  significant  drop  in
the  mid-1980s.  The EC  dominates the high-value-added  market
through heavy subsidies with which the United States may not find it
advantageous  to compete.  However,  the United States might rea-
sonably be expected  to retain  at least its  10 percent of this rapidly
expanding market.  Combining  high-value-added  exports with grains
159and soybeans,  overall U.S.  farm export growth  could average  5  per-
cent  to year  2000  but with substantial  year-to-year  variation  around
that trend.
Data from recent  studies by the  Food and Agricultural Policy  Re-
search Institute  (FAPRI) and Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)
(See  U.S.  Congress)  offer  significant  insight  into intermediate-term
export  prospects.  The  CBO  study projected  only to  1993,  hence the
time period  differs from the FAPRI  study which projects  to  1996.  It
should also  be noted that the  1988/89 data base is  not actual  exports
but estimates  assuming normal conditions.
*  U.S.  feed grain exports  are projected  to  grow 3.6 percent  per
year according to FAPRI and 3.3 percent per year according to CBO
(corn).
*  U.S.  wheat  exports are  projected to expand  1.6 percent  per
year (FAPRI) to 2.4 percent per year (CBO).
*  U.S.  soybean exports are projected  to grow only 1.9 to 2.8 per-
cent per year to the  mid-1990s.  As  projected by  FAPRI,  this growth
exceeds  that of competitors-an  unlikely prospect  unless U.S. policy
is  changed.
Taking  a weighted  average  of the above  projections,  U.S.  exports
of grain and soybeans growth ranges from 2.3 percent per year to
3.0 percent  per year using respectively  the  low and high estimates.
These estimates by CBO and FAPRI are at the low end of my earlier
projections.
We now combine  my earlier projections  of 2  to 5 percent export
demand  growth  with estimates  of domestic  demand growth  to  proj-
ect  aggregate  demand  growth  for U.S.  farm output.  The mid-range
estimate  of population  growth  by the  U.S.  Bureau  of the Census  is
0.6 percent in year 2000.  If the domestic  income elasticity of demand
is  0.05  and real income  per  capita is growing  2  percent per year,
then domestic  demand for food  will grow 0.6  +  0.05(2)  =  0.7  percent
per year  in year  2000.  If exports  grow on  average  by  2  percent per
year from  1988  to  2000,  they will  account  for 26  percent  of total  de-
mand for farm output by year 2000,  hence total demand  would be
expected to grow approximately 0.74(0.7)  +  0.26(2)  =  1.04 percent  in
year 2000.  If exports grow 5 percent from  1988 to year 2000, they will
account  for one-third  of total demand,  hence  total  demand for farm
output would be expected  to  grow approximately  0.67(0.7)  +  0.33(5)
=  2.12 percent in year 2000.
These estimates tend to run somewhat below the 1.5 to 2.4 percent
annual aggregate  supply expansion due  to productivity  gains pro-
jected  by the Council  for Agricultural  Science  and  Technology
(CAST) (Tweeten et al.,  pp.  15-19). The best guess is that productivi-
ty  gains  will continue  slightly to outpace demand  expansion by year
2000 and real farm prices will gradually diminish as in the past.
160While domestic  commodity  terms of trade (the  parity ratio)  proba-
bly will fall,  factor terms of trade (real price received  per unit of real
resources) probably  will continue  to increase  because resource  pro-
ductivity is likely to rise faster than real prices  fall.  Agriculture  is
likely to  remain economically  healthy but not necessarily  pros-
perous.  No major downsizing  of the agricultural plant appears to be
called  for because  of the similarities in rates  of expansion of supply
and demand.  Again it is important to reemphasize  that these  esti-
mates  are subject  to considerable  error.  And there will be sizable
variation around the long-term trend.  The latter is the major  diffi-
culty to producers exposed  to export markets.
Conclusions
1.  My  projections  anticipate  that overall  aggregate  U.S.  farm  ex-
port growth  will average  2-5 percent  per year to year  2000 and be-
yond.  The best guess is an average  rate of 3  percent annually.  That
is  sufficient growth to  avoid major  downsizing of the U.S.  agri-
cultural plant.  It is insufficient  growth  to create  major  capital  gains,
challenge  U.S.  production  capacity  or raise  real farm  commodity
and food prices.
2.  Export  projections  for  major commodities  vary widely  but also
tend to fall in the above  percentage  growth range.  My projections
anticipate the most rapid gain for soybeans while other sources proj-
ect most rapid  gains for coarse grains among major commodities.  Of
course,  all projections are subject to error.
3.  In the 1990s,  over half of all U.S. farm export markets are likely
to be in
*  High value  commodities,
*  Asia,  and
*  Less developed  countries.
4.  While  the  odds for  a major upward  or  downward trend in real
farm prices  are  small,  the  one  constant to expect  in exports  is vari-
ability.  Coping with the high annual and cyclical variability that inev-
itably attends  export  markets  is  the  major challenge  facing U.S.
farm policy.  Determining  the appropriate  level  of reserve  stocks  to
meet commitments  is a major policy issue  highlighted by  1988 condi-
tions and  the desire  of the United  States to be  a reliable  world
supplier of food.
5.  U.S.  agricultural export market potential in east and south Asia
(including China)  is massive.  For that potential to be realized,  the
developing countries will need to earn more hard currency-that re-
quires open markets in developed  countries.  The institutional  struc-
ture in  east and south Asian countries  has  not been conducive  to
trade in the  past but is undergoing  major  change.  If the exemplary
161economic institutions of Japan, South Korea  and Taiwan  are accept-
ed by China and India, the U.S. farm export future  is bright.
6.  The  NICs  of Asia constitute  continuing,  sizable  market  poten-
tial.  However,  Taiwan and South Korea are becoming so  wealthy
they can afford  to heavily  subsidize agriculture.  We  can expect tur-
bulence as  the United  States uses ending the NICs'  large trade sur-
pluses with us to win reduction of their market interventions.
7.  A heavily  indebted Latin America  is a  double threat to U.S.
farm  exports  as  debtors  at  once push  farm  exports and restrain im-
ports  of U.S.  farm products.  The debt  crisis continues  to loom large
in Subsaharan Africa as well. For U.S. agricultural trade potential to
be realized  in these  areas, greater urgency must be given to alleviat-
ing the debt crisis.
8.  The European  Community  is undergoing  significant changes  in
commodity programs.  For the United States the issue is not so much
one of opening new export markets but to get the EC to  diminish the
use of subsidies  to win new export markets.  The  EC must also be
discouraged  from pursuing domestic  import substitution to  keep out
our  corn  gluten and  soybeans.  The  urgency  of EC  to negotiate  has
diminished  at  least temporarily  with drought-induced  higher export
prices and lower restitution payments.
9.  In the long  term,  it makes little  sense  to force U.S.  export
prices to  below normal market levels through dumping  of CCC com-
modities  or  otherwise  subsidizing  exports.  Neither  does  it  make
sense to restrict  production  and hold export prices above  normal
market levels just because world trade markets are imperfect and
other countries  subsidize  exports and  production.  We need  not
"shoot  ourselves  in the  foot" just because  other  countries delight  in
"riddling  their  feet."  Bargaining  away EEP  and  TEA  in  return for
like concessions  from other countries in GATT negotiations would
yield a positive world  gain.
10.  Finally,  key countries  to watch for their influence on future
U.S. agricultural trade are the Soviet Union,  China and India.  These
countries bear close  scrutiny,  not only because  they are major po-
tential markets, but also because their policies are enigmatic and un-
predictable.
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